I study the egalitarian way of distributing resources across generations.
Introduction
This paper investigates the egalitarian way of distributing resources over time.
The egalitarian alternative doesn't need to be selected for allocating resources, but it is a necessary reference point for evaluating inequality of allocations and inequality aversion of different theories of intergenerational justice.
I consider a dynamic model of production, consumption, and investment. In each period, production transforms available capital goods in output. Output can be partly allocated for the consumption of the currently living generation and, for the remaining part, invested as capital goods for use in the following period. The egalitarian distribution of resources is identified by an (allocation) rule, i.e. a correspondence that selects a subset of feasible allocations for each intergenerational distribution problem.
1
A new impossibility result for intergenerational justice arises. Let fairness be interpreted by the following two requirements: no-domination requires that no generation is given less consumption than any other generation; equal treatment of equals requires that no generation finds its consumption less desirable than that assigned to any other generation with same preferences. These equity conditions are together not compatible with Pareto efficiency, even in a finite time horizon.
2 More strikingly, even if we were to accept considerably weaker version of such axioms, in fact infinitely weaker, the impossibility result remains.
The main result is to show that overcoming such tension is possible and determines a new ethical trade-off. The egalitarian planner has to make a choice: on the one hand, some allocations satisfy strong equity conditions among proximate generations, but allow for large inequalities among distant generations (longterm inequality); on the other hand, some allocations satisfy sufficiently weak equity conditions among all generations, but allow for some inequalities among proximate generations (short-term inequality). I name this ethical dilemma the long-term/short-term inequality trade-off.
Along the lines of such ethical choice, two families of rules arise: the "time independent rules" and the "sequential rules". Time independent rules are rules 1 Differently from the majority of contributions on intergenerational equity, this approach belongs to the literature on fair allocation theory. In this setting, the social choice is described by a rule and the appeal of a rule is judged by the social relevance of the axioms it satisfies. For a survey on fair allocation theory, see Thomson (2011) . I discuss how the present contribution relates to the literature in the next subsection.
2 Well-known difficulties characterize the infinite horizon framework (see the seminal contribution of Diamond, 1965 , and the recent review by Asheim, 2010) . To distinguish the sources of tension between equity and efficiency, I first analyze the finite time horizon, and then extend the framework to the infinite time horizon.
that treat each generation independently of the time they live in. Belonging to this family, an adapted version of the "budget constrained Pareto optimal" method, introduced by Moulin (1991) , and the "egalitarian equivalent" solution, by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) . The first rule guarantees that no generation is given less than any other generation (no-domination), but cannot guarantee that each generation finds its consumption bundle at least as desirable as an (arbitrarily small) fraction of what is assigned to any other generation with the same preferences. The second rule guarantees that generations with same preferences are treated alike (equal treatment of equals), but cannot guarantee that each generation be given more than an (arbitrarily small) fraction of what is given to any other generation.
Sequential rules select allocations that satisfy both fairness requirement, i.e.
no-domination and equal treatment of equals, among pairs of successive generations. Equitable distribution of resources among proximate generations comes, however, at the cost of long-term inequalities: equity cannot be guaranteed among more distant generations. Although long-term inequalities might be inevitable, the interest of present and far-future generations is not to be sacrificed and all generations can be treated with equal concern.
The basic difficulty
Let the distributional equity requirement be no-envy: an allocation satisfies no-envy if no member of the society would be better-off with the bundle assigned to someone else (see Foley, 1967; Kolm, 1972; Varian, 1974) . This axiom is much stronger than those discussed in the paper, but proves particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it is ethically appealing and compatible with Pareto efficiency in static resource distribution problems. Second, the tension between no-envy and efficiency highlights the mechanisms responsible for the main impossibility result. I illustrate the issue with a simple two-agent two-good example.
Consider two agents, A and B, living in two different locations, L A and L B .
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Agents have preferences R A and R B over bundles of goods1 and 2.
4 All goods to 3 Locations can be indifferently interpreted over space or time.
4 Throughout the paper, preferences are allowed to differ among generations. Such generality provides a more flexible and, arguably, more realistic framework to study intergenerational justice: in the philosophical literature, Barry (1999) suggests that we should take into account that different generations have different views of what constitutes a good life.
First, since each generation represents many different agents (with different preferences), a change in generation's composition over time will modify it's aggregate preferences. Second, indifference curves change among generations as a result of an evolutionary process (see Alger and Weibull, 2013) or might represent varying tastes, when commodity's social attributes distribute, say Ω ∈ R 2 ++ , are at location L A . Thus, these goods can be assigned to agent A, but need to be transported to location L B , before being assigned to agent B. Transportation is assumed to involve a (linear) transformation of goods.
5 Let ρ ≡ ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ R 2 ++ be the coefficients of such transformation: the set of feasible consumption bundles is (
Pareto efficiency, at interior allocations, requires marginal rates of substitution be related as follows:
A : the transformation of the leftover after the consumption of A is represented by the dashed arrow from
is efficient. The marginal rate of substitution of A at x A is represented by the dotted line through x A and is parallel to the dotted line through Ω−x A : varying the consumption of A along the first one determines an opposite variation of the leftover Ω − x A . Due to the transformation ρ, when Ω − x A varies along the dotted line, the maximum consumption of B changes along the dotted line through x B (with twice the slope of the first one). Since this is exactly the marginal rate of substitution of B at x B (formally M RS A = 1 2 M RS B ) and all resources are distributed, the allocation (x A , x B ) is efficient. The contract curves are the dash-dotted lines going from 0 to Ω for agent A and from ρΩ to 0 for B.
This allocation fails, however, to satisfy no-envy: agent A would be better-off with x B , while B would be better-off with x A . Furthermore, no other efficient distribution of resources can satisfy no-envy: moving along the contract curves, when the envy of one agent is resolved -by making him better-off -the envy of the other agent is deepened.
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The intuition of the result is as follows. At efficient allocations, the relative scarcity of goods differs across location and defines the social cost of each agent's consumption bundle. Thus, when an agent prefers most the good that is for him relatively scarce, it might be too expensive (and thus not feasible) to assign to change how fixed underlying preferences manifest (see Karni and Schmeidler, 1990) . Third, preferences can vary according to the different motivational states -determined by motivationally salient properties like varying technology and environment -through which alternatives are ranked (see Dietrich and List, 2013) . Forth, commodities might be interpreted as Lancaster's characteristics (intrinsic properties of goods) for which different preferences represent varying consumption technology (Lancaster, 1966) .
5 Such transformation can be interpreted as a transportation (iceberg) cost, when the transfer is over space, or returns on savings/investments, when the transfer is over time.
6 A similar tension between efficiency and no-envy was highlighted by Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) in a static framework with consumption, leisure, and heterogeneous working skills. As in their case, the difficulty highlighted is not due to externalities or non-convexities. each his favorite bundle. Importantly, this difficulty holds for any ρ such that ρ 1 ρ 2 = 1: thus, the transformation of the left-over might describe a transfer cost (ρ ≤ 1), a productive return (ρ ≥ 1), or a combination of them.
Related literature
The axiomatic literature on intergenerational equity has its roots in the seminal contributions of Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965) . Diamond, in particular, establishes a key negative result: there is no continuous ordering that is Pareto efficient and treats all generations equally. The egalitarian concern is interpreted as "finite anonymity;" it requires the ranking to be invariant to permutations of utilities of a finite number of generations.
7 The underlying assumption of the utility streams literature is that generations are treated equally when they achieve the same index of well-being (which requires comparability of welfare across generations).
The present work is complementary to the utility streams literature as it addresses the meaning of equality in terms of distribution of resources. Proving how difficult it is to assign consumption bundles such that generations are treated equally, the paper emphasizes that equality of well-beings (indepen-7 Further advances of the utility streams literature are surveyed in Asheim (2010) .
dently of how these are measured) cannot correspond to a very egalitarian distribution of resources. Second, if equal well-being should be attributed to generations when their consumptions are equitably assigned, the long-term/shortterm inequality trade-off imposes a crucial constraint on how to construct such well-being indexes. In a one-commodity framework, it is straightforward to identify inequalities by how much each generation is assigned. 8 In such a setting, Epstein (1986) redistribution of resources via production and investment with a multidimensional commodity framework. As in Asheim et al. (2010) , the incompatibility between equity and efficiency in the infinite horizon framework is avoided by imposing specific domain restriction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the finite-time model of the economy. In Section 3, I discuss the tension between equity and efficiency. In Section 4, I present the ethical dilemma of the egalitarian ethical observer and show which egalitarian rules can be defined. In Section 5, I extend the model and the results to the infinite horizon framework.
In Section 6, I conclude. Longer proofs are gathered in the appendix.
The model
The economy spans a finite number of periods T ≡ {0, 1, ...,t}. Let L be a finite set of infinitely divisible and privately appropriable goods.
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For each t ∈ T , there is a vector k t ∈ R L + of capital goods available in 8 The same natural comparability applies when preferences are constant over time: inequalities are identified by differences in achieved well-beings. This is the case, among many others, of the seminal contribution of Koopmans, 1960) .
9 The notation for vector inequalities is as follows: x y means that x i ≥ y i for all i; x ≥ y means that x i ≥ y i for all i and x = y; x > y means that x i > y i for all i. With a slight abuse of notation, the sets and their cardinality are indicated with the same capital letter. period t. These resources are used as input in production. For each t ∈ T , let F t : R L + → R L + be the production correspondence and let y t ∈ R L + denote the output. Let F be the set of correspondences F t satisfying the following restrictions:
11 and vii) F t satisfies no-free lunch: {0} = F t (0).
A profile of technologies is a list (F 0 , ..., Ft) ∈ F T .
For each t ∈ T , the output y t can be used in two ways: part of it is used for consumption at t -let x t ∈ R L + be the vector of goods used in this way -and the remaining part determines the capital goods to be used as input in production at t + 1 -let k t+1 ≤ y t − x t be this remainder.
12
10 I do not restrict the technology to be a transformation of netputs, for which for some net amount of goods to be created (output larger than input), some other goods need to be destroyed (input larger than output). This would provide a realistic description of reality, but would also require L to include all existing commodities. The absence of such a restriction is more in line with the macroeconomic literature, where the net return on capital can be larger than one. The results of the finite horizon model do not depend on this restriction. In the infinite horizon version, a lower bound on productivity is necessary to combine equity and efficiency even in a one-dimensional framework (see Asheim et al., 2010) . As an example, assume a unit of good has to be shared among infinite many agents -corresponding to the case of one commodity with unitary net return on capital: equality, requiring all agents to be assigned the same quantity, is not compatible with efficiency, requiring the good to be distributed to the agents.
11 Requirement iii) that Ft (kt) be convex is a restriction on the set of outputs that can be produced for each given amount of inputs. Requirement vi) is instead about the convexity of the production correspondence: a linear combination of outputs can be produced with the corresponding linear combination of inputs.
12 For the sake of simplicity, resources, output, and consumption are defined on the same commodity space. The results extend to the case in which resources and consumption are defined in (possibly different) subsets of the output space.
Each generation lives for one period. For each t ∈ T , generation t has a preference relation R t defined over R L + . Let I t and P t be the symmetric and asymmetric relations induced by R t . Let R be the set of orders R t satisfying the following assumptions:
ii) R t is strictly monotonic; and iii) R t is convex.
A profile of preferences is a list
+ be the capital that (imperatively) needs to be left over at the end of the time horizon.
Requiring kt +1 = 0 does not affect the results, but kt +1 ≥ 0 is needed for the later extension to infinite time horizon, when such capital is required to produce goods for later generations.
such that
and that satisfies the boundary conditions on initial and final capital.
Let E be the domain of economies with at least one feasible allocation. For each E ∈ E, let A (E) be the set of feasible allocations of E E E.
Let E ∈ E. An allocation a ∈ A (E) is (Pareto) efficient for E E E if there is no a ∈ A (E) such that for each t ∈ T , x t R t x t , and for some t ∈ T , x t P t x t .
Let P (E) be the set of efficient allocations of E E E.
An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a mapping that associates to each economy a non-empty subset of its set of feasible allocations. The generic notation for a rule is the letter ψ, i.e. ψ : E → A (E).
The tension between equity and efficiency
In this section, I show how deep the tension between equity and efficiency is. I suggest equity be interpreted by two very weak axioms that compare the bundle of goods generations are assigned.
Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. The first axiom requires that no generation be assigned less than a fraction ε of the bundle assigned to each other generation. 15 When ε = 1, the axiom is equivalent to no-domination and requires no generation be assigned less of each good than another (this was introduced by Thomson, 1983 , in a static framework). As ε decreases the requirement becomes weaker and weaker. When ε = 0, the axiom is vacuous.
The second axiom requires that no generation be assigned a bundle that it finds less desirable than a fraction ε of the bundle assigned to each other generation with the same preferences. When ε = 1, the axiom is equivalent to equal treatment of equals and requires generations with same preferences to be indifferent between their consumptions. 16 As ε decreases the requirement becomes weaker and weaker. When ε = 0, the axiom is vacuous.
Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. For each economy E ∈ E, an allocation a = {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈
A (E) satisfies ε ε ε-equal treatment of equals if for each pair t, t ∈ T such that
The next result shows that efficiency is not compatible with both ε−nodomination and ε −equal treatment of equals, when ε, ε > 0. To strengthen this impossibility result, I prove it on the restricted domain of economies with linear and time-invariant technologies. Let B be a positive semi-definite diagonal matrix L×L. LetF be the set of linear technologies; that is, technologies
LetĒ Ē E ⊂ E be the domain of economies with linear and time-invariant technologies; that is, technologies such that for each E ∈ E and each pair t, t ∈ T , F t = F t ∈F. Theorem 1. On the domainĒ and for each pair ε, ε ∈ (0, 1], no rule satisfies Pareto efficiency, ε-no-domination, and ε -equal treatment of equals.
15 The idea to parametrize equity axioms was introduced by Moulin and Thomson (1988) and used in the intergenerational framework by Isaac and Piacquadio (2012) .
16 Equal treatment of equals, in the dynamic setting, demands the time generations live in to be irrelevant, as soon as these are indistinguishable in terms of personal traits (i.e. preferences). Proof. Let ε, ε > 0. For each t ∈ T and each x t ∈ R L + , let m t (x t ) be the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between c and w of generation t at x t . For each E ∈Ē and each t ∈ T , let generation t's contract curve be defined as:
Step 1. Let E ∈Ē be such that t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, 3}, L = {c, w}, and y be represented by utility v (x) = c β w 1−β with α, β ∈ (0, 1) and
Consider allocations that assign strictly positive consumption bundles to each generation. Then, C t , restricted to positive consumptions, are (a portion of) linear functions described by w = r t c and are such that r 0 = r 1 = ρ 2 r 2 = ρ 2 r 3 . These are represented in Figure 3 .1 as dash-dotted lines.
Step 2. Let a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) be such that:
for each t ∈ T ;
ii) x 1 = εx 0 , i.e. a (minimally) satisfies ε-no-domination between generations 0 and 1;
iii) u (x 0 ) = u (ε x 2 ) and v (ε x 1 ) = v (x 3 ), i.e. a (minimally) satisfies ε -equal treatment of equals between generations 0 and 2 and between generations 1 and 3.
Step 3. By strict convexity of preferences, a is the only feasible allocation for
withā = a satisfies the same properties. Step 4. Let x 0 ≡ (c 0 , w 0 ) ∈ C 0 be assigned to 0. Efficiency and u (x 0 ) =
A conflict arises with ε-no-domination since for each pair ε, ε > 0, there is ρ such that x 2 < εx 3 . To show this, let α =
This result implies the same negative conclusion between efficiency, nodomination, and equal treatment of equals, which corresponds to the case ε = ε = 1. It also implies the clash between efficiency and no-envy presented in the introduction (as no-envy is stronger than no-domination and equal treatment of equals). This impossibility result is particularly strong. The ethical observer cannot commit to both distributing efficiently resources and treat generations equitably according to the above fairness criteria.
A key role is played by the Pareto principle. It is very demanding as it forces the decision-maker to take into account that generations face different economic conditions, i.e. the relative scarcity of goods. I nevertheless believe that it is important to investigate what an egalitarian allocation of resources is, without weakening efficiency. In fact, the utility possibility set of generations (however utilities are measured) is a compact set. Thus, starting from an inefficient allocation, it is always possible to smoothly and continuously distribute across all generations the available efficiency gains.
While efficiency tells that time should matter, the equity requirements constrain inequalities in terms of assigned goods and impede the decision-maker to place much importance to the time generations live in. Furthermore, the two axioms operate differently: ε-no-domination introduces an evaluation of goods based on physical amounts; ε-equal treatment of equals introduces evaluations based on generations preferences. The richness of the dynamic framework with at least 4 generations (as in the proof above) impedes defining a common-ground evaluation of goods that is efficient and compatible with both equity axiom, independently of how weak (but not vacuous) these requirements are.
The long-term/short-term inequality trade-off
In this section, I study how much it is necessary to weaken equity in order to restore compatibility with efficiency.
Let an axiom be comparative if it requires an allocation to satisfy a property assessed in terms of binary comparison between consumption bundles assigned to generations.
17 In this framework, the strength of a comparative axiom 17 Comparative axioms belong to the category that Thomson (2001) identifies as "punctual inter-personal" axioms. Punctual axioms are those that apply to each economy separately; these are opposed to "relational" axioms that involve comparisons between economies. Interpersonal axioms satisfy comparisons between bundles assigned to more than one agent; these are opposed to "intra-personal" axioms that hold on an agent-by-agent basis. Comparative axioms restrict the punctual inter-personal requirements to binary comparisons of bundles, i.e. involving only one pair of generations at a time.
can be measure along two directions, named "trait" and "scope".
The trait of a comparative axiom is defined as the condition that the axiom requires on the bundles assigned to a pair of generations. Reducing the parameter ε of, for example, ε−no-domination weakens the trait of the axiom.
The scope of a comparative axiom is defined as the set of all pairs of generations among which the axiom's condition is imposed. For each comparative axiom, say "equity", let n-period "equity" be the axiom obtained by imposing the condition of "equity" to all the pairs of generations belonging to each subset of n successive generations. As n decreases the axiom becomes weaker and weaker.
When n = 1 no binary comparison is allowed and the axiom is vacuous. Let n ≥ 2 and ε ∈ [0, 1]. Then, n n n-period ε ε ε-no domination requires that no two generations living apart for fewer than n periods be assigned less than a fraction ε of the others' consumption bundle. Similarly, n n n-period ε ε ε-equal treatment of equals requires that no two generations with the same preferences living apart for fewer than n periods be assigned bundles that one finds less desirable than a fraction ε of the others' bundle.
Inequalities can be roughly measured by: i) the number of violations of the equity condition of an axiom (in terms of the scope parameter n); and ii) by the intensity of such violations (in terms of the trait parameter ε). While Theorem 1 tells that some inequalities are unavoidable, the next result identifies which inequalities can be avoided and which cannot. More precisely, it introduces a new ethical dilemma for egalitarianism: the long-term/short-term inequality trade-off.
A natural choice for the ethical observer is to give up either ε−no-domination or ε−equal treatment of equals. Although this allows satisfying the remaining axiom with full trait, i.e. ε = 1, it is not possible to avoid large inequalities among proximate-living generations (short-term inequalities). Allocations that satisfy efficiency and no-domination do not guarantee that each generation be assigned a bundle it considers as desirable as the ε > 0 fraction of what was assigned to the previous (or successive) generation with the same preferences, no matter how small ε is. Similarly, allocations that satisfy efficiency and equal treatment of equals do not guarantee that each generation be assigned a bundle that is at least as large as the ε > 0 fraction of what was assigned to the previous generation, no matter how small ε is. A further alternative is however possible: both axioms can be satisfied with full trait among pairs of successive generations (with n = 2). The flip side of the coin is that possibly large inequalities arise among more distant genera-tions (long-term inequalities). Allocations that satisfy efficiency and both 2−period no-domination and 2−period equal treatment of equal do not guarantee that both ε−no-domination and ε −equal treatment of equals be satisfied among the other generations, no matter how small (but positive) ε and ε are.
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Theorem 2. Let ε, ε ∈ [0, 1] and n, n ≥ 2. On the domain E, let a rule ψ satisfy efficiency, n-period ε−no-domination and n -period ε −equal treatment of equals. Then: 1) a) a rule ψ satisfying the above axioms with (n − 2) ε = 0 is well-defined if and only if ε = 0; b) a rule ψ satisfying the above axioms with (n − 2) ε = 0 is well-defined if and only if ε = 0;
2) a rule ψ satisfying the above axioms with εε = 0 is well-defined if and only if (n − 2) (n − 2) = 0. The dilemma highlighted by Theorem 2 is new to the literature on intergenerational justice. When information about generations well-being is comparable, it is natural to interpret equal consideration for all generations as an independence of achieved utilities with respect to the time generations live in (usually expressed in the form of invariance to permutations and referred to as "anonymity").
By addressing distributional equity with non-comparable information about preferences, I question which bundles generations should be assigned at the egalitarian distribution of resources (which can then possibly be used to attribute an equal measure of well-beings). The dilemma is thus orthogonal to independence to permutation of well-beings: anonymity operates at the level of evaluating 18 An attractive feature of this alternative is that "stronger" equality among successive generations is more likely to achieve policy implementability. Generations can immediately compare their-selves with proximate generations; thus, it is easier for the planner to obtain their agreement when the underlying egalitarian distribution of resources treats these proximate generations similarly enough. It appears more arduous to convince the next generation to accept a smaller bundle (compared to the present generation's one) justified by the idea that in the far future some generation with same preferences will achieve the same indifference curve. In the same way, it seems unlikely to convince the next generation (with same preferences) to be worse-off than the present one to guarantee that each future generation is assigned non-dominated bundles.
streams of comparable well-being levels; the long-term/short-term inequality trade-off arises at the level of the construction of such comparable indexes.
It is thus not inconsistent to attribute the same utility level at allocations selected by rules in 2) of Theorem 2 and, together, to rank equally two streams of utilities when one is the permutation of the other. Such an ethical observer agrees that the value of goods might change over time and accepts such flexible evaluation to better compare proximate-living generations. At the same time, this ethical observer treats inequalities of achieved utilities independently of the time generations live in.
Time independent rules
Let time-independent rules be those that satisfy equity axioms with full scope.
19 These rules satisfy the feeling of justice according to which selected allocations should not discriminate by generation names: a generation t and a generation t should be assigned goods independently of what the times t and t are. Among the rules that satisfy efficiency and no-domination, I adapt to the dynamic framework one proposed by Moulin (1991) : the "budget constrained Pareto optimal method". Define the rule ψ bcpo as the one that, for each economy E ∈ E, selects an efficient allocation that assigns to each generation a bundle of goods with equal value, according to some given price vector p ∈ R L ++ . Formally, for each E ∈ E:
19 A formal definition of time-independence as an axiom is given hereafter. It is formalized as an anonymity property that relies on permuting agents. The additional difficulty is the need of correspondingly vary the economy such that the set of feasible consumption allocations for the new economy is the permutation of the initial one.
Let E ∈ E. Denote by X (E) be the set of such consumption plans; a (feasible) consumption plan is a vector x ≡ {xt} t∈T ∈ X (E) such that there exists an allocation a ≡ k t,ȳt,xt t∈T ∈ A (E) with xt =xt for each t ∈ T . For each x ∈ X (E) and each π, let xπ ≡ x π(t) t∈T be the permuted consumption plan of x with respect to π. For each E ∈ E and each π, the permuted economy (of E with respect to π) is Eπ ≡ k t , k t , {F t } t∈T , {R t } t∈T with Rt = R π(t) and such that xπ ∈ X (Eπ) if and only if
x ∈ X (E), where xπ is the permuted consumption plan of x with respect to π. A rule ψ satisfies time independence if for each E ∈ E and for each π : T → T , a ≡ {kt, yt, xt} t∈T ∈ ψ (E) implies that, whenever Eπ ∈ E, there exists a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ ψ (Eπ) such that x = xπ. All time-independent rules satisfy this axiom.
The next result shows that the rule ψ bcpo exists.
Lemma 1. On the domain E, the rule ψ bcpo is well-defined.
Proof. Let E ∈ E. Let the set of feasible budgets at prices p > 0 be
The set B is non-empty and compact. Letb ≡ max b B. By contradiction, assume that the corresponding allocation a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) is not efficient for E and let a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) be such that for each t ∈ T , x t R t x t and for some t ∈ T , x t P t x t . By continuity of the preferences and upper hemicontinuity of the production correspondences, there is a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) with b >b such that for each t ∈ T , x t R t x t and for some t ∈ T , x t P t x t .
An example of a rule that satisfies efficiency and equal treatment of equals is the "egalitarian equivalent rule," introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) .
It selects efficient allocations such that each agent finds his consumption as desirable as a reference bundle that is named egalitarian equivalent. Let function f : R + → R L + be continuous, strictly increasing, unbounded, and such that f (0) = 0. Let Z denote the image of f . For each E ∈ E, the egalitarian equivalent solution is defined by: ψ ee (E) = {a ∈ A (E) |a ∈ P (E) and ∃z ∈ Z with x t I t z ∀t ∈ T } .
Lemma 2. On the domain E, the rule ψ ee is well-defined.
Proof. For each E ∈ E, assumptions i), ii), iv), v), and vii) of the technology and monotonicity and continuity of preferences guarantee that P (E) is compact.
Thus, the result of Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) applies.
Sequential rules
The family of rules I present next satisfy both no-domination and equal treatment of equals among pairs of successive generations.
20
20 The impossibility of satisfying equity restrictions among more distant generations (as proven in Theorem 2) might lead to allocations that are biased in favor of present or future generations. Such issue is related to the axioms of "no-dictatorship of the present" and "nodictatorship of the future" introduced by Chichilnisky (1996) for the infinite utility streams literature: these require the social evaluation to be sensitive to the well-being of the far future I first introduce an equity axiom that, close in spirit to no-envy, implies both 2-period no-domination and 2-period equal treatment of equals. Consider a pair of successive generations t and t + 1. The axiom is satisfied if switching their respective consumption bundles either makes them both better-off or makes them both worse-off.
For each E ∈ E, a = {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) satisfies sequential permutation solidarity if for each t ∈ {t, ...,t − 1}:
Let the sequential rules be the family of rules satisfying efficiency and sequential permutation solidarity. The existence of such rules, together with Lemmas 1 and 2, completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 3. One the domain E, the sequential rules are well-defined.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Extension to the infinite horizon
The infinite-horizon economy spans periods T ≡ {t, t + 1, ...} with t ≥ 0. Assumptions i)-vii) on technology and assumptions i)-iii) on preferences hold: a profile of technologies is a list F t , F t+1 , ... ∈ F T and a profile of preferences is a list R t , R t+1 , ... ∈ R T .
An infinite-horizon economy is a list
The set of feasible allocations for E is denoted by A (E): it satisfies conditions (2.1). The set of efficient allocations for E is denoted by P (E). Finally, for each a ∈ A (E), denote by E ≥t k t the reduced economy of E with endowment k t k t k t , obtained by taking as initial time t ≥ t and as initial resourcesk t = k t (defined in a).
and of the present generations. In the present framework, it is possible to guarantee equal concern to present and future generations by requiring a rule to be independent with respect to the only permutation that preserves the proximity of generations. This permutation is such that the last generation becomes the first one, the second-last generation becomes the second one, etc... As for time independence, the permutation is equally applied to the technology, such that the economic circumstances of each generation remain invariant. For each E ∈ E, let π ti : T → T be the permutation defined by π ti (t) =t − t. A rule ψ satisfies time inversion invariance if for each economy E ∈ E, a ≡ {kt, yt, xt} t∈T ∈ ψ (E) implies that there exists a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ ψ (E π ti ) such that x = xπ. Time inversion invariance is satisfied by the non-empty subset of sequential rules that treat pairs of successive generations symmetrically.
To deal with the infinite horizon, two alternative domain restrictions are introduced on preferences and technology. The idea is to define a finite timet after which the issues of comparability of preferences and the tension between equity and efficiency are ruled out. First is the assumption of existence of an efficient distribution of consumption that sustains in the long-run an equal budget -measured at time invariant prices; second is the assumption that preferences are homogeneous in the long-run and that there is an efficient distribution of consumption that treats them alike (these are indifferent between their assigned consumptions).
there is a finite timē
∞ , there is a finite timet ∈ T such that: 2) a rule ψ satisfying the above axioms with εε = 0 is well-defined if and only if (n − 2) (n − 2) = 0.
The proof of the impossibility result is immediate: it is sufficient to note that for each finite horizon economy introduced for proving the corresponding finite-horizon result, one can extend the economy such that efficiency and equity impose a specific allocation for all (infinite) following generations, parametrized by the final capital stock kt +1 .
Assumption A1 is introduced to guarantee that the existence result of Lemma 1 extends. Assumption A2 is similarly introduced to extend the existence results of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 4. On the domain E ∞ A1 , the rule ψ bcpo is well-defined.
Lemma 5. On the domain E ∞ A2 , the rule ψ ee is well-defined.
Lemma 6. On the domain E ∞ A2 , sequential rules are well-defined.
Conclusions
In the economic literature, intergenerational justice is generally addressed by ranking streams of a comparable index of well-being. This is the case of the discounting literature (Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2007) and of the utility streams literature (Diamond, 1965; Svensson, 1980; Basu and Mitra, 2003; Zuber and Asheim, 2012) . 21 In such frameworks, it is natural to call egalitarian each allocation for which well-being is equalized among generations. In the present contribution, instead, I will consider different notions of fairness, based on comparing the consumption bundles assigned to generations.
In a discrete time model of investment, production, and consumption, I show that a strong clash arises between efficiency and distributional equity. This difficulty unveils a deep "equity gap": equalizing well-beings -however these are measured -cannot guarantee that the corresponding allocation distributes resources in a satisfactory way. In particular, it is not possible to distribute resources efficiently and at the same time guarantee that:
1. each generation's assignment is at least as large as an arbitrarily small fraction of the bundle assigned to any other generation (ε-no-domination);
2. each generation finds its assignment at least as desirable as an arbitrarily small fraction of the bundle assigned to any other generation with the same preferences (ε-equal treatments of equals).
Responsible for such difficulty is neither technological change nor the time horizon, but the evolution of resource scarcity over time. When goods have a different productivity (even if time-invariant), resource scarcity changes over time.
Then, Pareto efficiency forces the ethical observer to account for this evolution in terms of marginal rates of substitutions; equity conditions, instead, impede the ethical observer to make too much of a difference of such change to avoid discrimination across generations. Egalitarian allocations can be defined only with weaker requirements.
The main contribution of the paper is to draw the exact boundaries between impossibility and possibility results. While a more conventional strategy suggests adopting only one of the above equity requirements, in this dynamic framework there is a further option: reducing the number of successive generations among which equity is imposed. This shows that egalitarianism can be defined along the lines of a newly identified ethical dilemma: the shortterm/long-term inequality trade-off. The ethical observer can choose between satisfying stronger equity conditions among pairs of successive generations or weaker equity conditions among all (and more distant) generations.
A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. (⇒) 1a) The proof is identical to that of Theorem 1, where the axiom of 3-period ε-equal treatment of equals is substituted for ε-equal treatment of equals and 2−period ε -no-domination is substituted for ε -no-domination.
1b) The proof is based on the same logic and follows similar steps.
Step 1. Let E ∈Ē be such that t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, 3}, L = {c, w}, and y 
Consider allocations that assign strictly positive consumption bundles to each generation. Then, the contract curve C t (defined in the proof of Theorem 1), restricted to positive consumptions, is a (portion of) linear function described by w = r t c and is such that r 0 = r 1 = ρr 2 = ρr 3 . These are represented in Figure A .1 as dash-dotted lines.
Step 2. Let a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ A (E) be such that: Figure A .1: Clash between efficiency, 3-period ε−no-domination, and 2-period ε −equal treatment of equals.
ii) x 2 = εx 0 , i.e. a (minimally) satisfies 3-period ε-no-domination between generations 0 and 2;
iii) u (x 0 ) = u (ε x 1 ) and v (ε x 2 ) = v (x 3 ), i.e. a (minimally) satisfies 2-period ε -equal treatment of equals between generations 0 and 1 and between generations 2 and 3.
Step 3. By strict convexity of preferences, a is the only feasible allocation for E satisfying i)-iii). By contradiction, assumeā ≡ k t ,ȳ t ,x t t∈T ∈ A (E) withā = a satisfies the same properties.
that c 3 = εε ρ 1−β c 0 and w 3 = εε ρ −β w 0 .
The conflict arises with 3-period ε-no-domination since for each ε, ε > 0,
there is ρ such that x 1 < εx 3 . To show this, let α = 1 2 and β = 1 1+ρ 2 . When
2(1+ρ 2 ) > 1, it follows that:
2) The above result in 1a), or equivalently 2a), also shows that no rule satisfies efficiency, 3-period ε-equal treatment of equals, and 3-period ε -nodomination with ε, ε > 0.
(⇐) The "if" part is shown by constructing rules satisfying the specific version of the axioms. The corresponding results are presented in Lemmas 1-3.
B Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The logic of the proof is as follows. First, I construct a set of rays corresponding to the consumption bundles assigned to each generation at efficient allocations. Second, I define a correspondence and prove the existence of its fixed points. Third, I show that these points identify the allocations satisfying efficiency and sequential permutation solidarity. Let E ∈ E.
Case 1. Assume a ∈ A (E) implies that x t = 0 for each t ∈ T . Then all feasible allocations satisfy sequential permutation solidarity and efficiency. Case 2. Assume instead that there is a ∈ A (E) such that x t ≥ 0 for some t ∈ T . Let X ≡ x t , x t+1 , ..., , xt a = {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ P (E) and
When is sufficiently small, X is non empty. Let be such that X is nonempty. For each t ∈ T , let
Since X is non empty, alsoΞ t is for each t ∈ T . LetΞ ≡Ξ t ×Ξ t+1 × ... ×Ξ t and let Ξ be the convex hull ofΞ . The elements of Ξ are lists of rays (one for each generation), i.e. elements of the L-simplex. Since the set P (E) is compact, so are X and Ξ .
For each list ξ ∈ Ξ , each a ∈ A (E), and each t ∈ T , let x ξ t be such that ξ = x ξ t x ξ t 1 with x ξ t I t x t . Let the permutation gain on ξ ξ ξ of generation t t t towards t t t at allocation a a a be denoted by d
For each ξ ∈ Ξ , the assumptions on d guarantee that permutation gains are well-defined. For each g ∈ G and each ξ ∈ Ξ , let
Let V : Ξ → Ξ be the correspondence that associates each ξ ∈ Ξ with a subset of Ξ defined by
I show that when > 0 is sufficiently small, for each ξ ∈ Ξ , there is a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈T ∈ P (E) g ξ (E) such that x ∈ X . Let u ∈ U (a representation of preferences). For each ξ ∈ Ξ , let
The set U t (ξ) is non-empty: by the assumptions on production and the conditions of Case 2, there is a ∈ A (E) with x t ≥ 0 such that for each t ∈ {t, ..
; since the functions g, list ξ, and consumption bundle x t uniquely determine the indifference curves of all generations, monotonicity of preference implies that x t ≥ 0 for each t ∈ T and, since 0 < ≤ x t 1 for each t ∈ T , also that x ∈ X . The set U t (ξ) is bounded: there is no a ∈ A (E) for which u t > max yt∈Ft(ωt) u t y t . The set U t (ξ) is compact: the set P (E) is compact and the indifference curve each generation achieves depends monotonically on u t x t ; for each pair a, a ∈ g ξ (E), u t x t > u t x t implies that a Pareto dominates a . Thus, if a ∈ g ξ (E) is such that u t x t is maximal in U t (ξ), then a ∈ P (E).
Since z ∈ V (ξ) is a normalization of consumption bundles at efficient allocations, V (ξ) ⊆ Ξ . By assumptions on technology and preferences, V is compact, convex, and upper hemicontinuous. The existence of an allocation satisfying the requirements follows by Kakutani's fixed-point theorem. Since such an alloca-tion exists for each economy, the sequential rule is well-defined.
C Proofs of the results in Section 5
Theorem 3.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1. Let ε, ε > 0.
Step
The technology is such that y be represented by utility v (x) = c β w 1−β with α, β ∈ (0, 1) and
Consider allocations that assign strictly positive consumption bundles to each generation. Then, the contract curve C t , restricted to positive consumptions, is a (portions of) linear function described by w = r t c and is such that r 0 = r 1 = ρ 2 r t for each t ≥ 2.
i) a ∈ P (E), i.e. x t ∈ C t for each t ∈ T or, equivalently, m 0 (x 0 ) = ρ t m t (x t ) for each t ∈ T ;
ii) x 1 = εx 0 , i.e. a (minimally) satisfies ε−no-domination between generations 0 and 1;
iii) u (x 0 ) = u (ε x 2 ) and v (ε x 1 ) = v (x 3 ), i.e. a (minimally) satisfies ε −equal treatment of equals between generations 0 and 2 and between generations 1 and 3;
for each t ≥ 3, i.e. satisfies ε−no-domination and ε −equal treatment of equals for each t, t ≥ 3.
Step 3. Such allocations a exists, but is not necessarily unique. For each a ∈ A (E), let a <t ≡ {ω t , y t , x t } t∈[t,t−1) be the allocation up to timet − 1 such that a = a <t |a ≥t .
Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that there is a unique distribution of resources a <4 for each k 4 (final capital goods defining the finite horizon economy limited to generations 0 to 3). Note that the proof does not rely on the total amount of resources as long as feasible allocations with strictly positive consumption exist and thus extends to this framework.
Assume k 4 ∈ R L + is so large that no positive consumption can be assigned to generations 0 to 3, then the equity restriction iv) can not be satisfied between generations 3 and 4 and allocation a does not satisfy conditions i)-iv) set in
Step 2). Let a be otherwise.
Step 4. Let x 0 ≡ (c 0 , w 0 ) be assigned to 0; efficiency and u (x 0 ) =
A conflict arises with ε-no-domination since for each ε, ε > 0, there is ρ such that x 2 < εx 3 . To show this, let α = 
tions, is a (portion of) linear function described by w = r t c and is such that r 0 = r 1 = ρr t for each t ≥ 2.
i) a ∈ P (E), i.e. x t ∈ C t for each t ∈ T or, equivalently, m 0 (x 0 ) = ρ t m t (x t )
iii) u (x 0 ) = u (ε x 1 ) and v (ε x 2 ) = v (x 3 ), i.e. a (minimally) satisfies 2-period ε-equal treatment of equals between generations 0 and 1 and between generations 2 and 3; iv)
xt+1 max[ε,ε ] ≤ x t ≤ max [ε, ε ] x t+1 and xt+2 max[ε,ε ] ≤ x t ≤ max [ε, ε ] x t+2 for each t ≥ 3, i.e. satisfies 3-period ε -no-domination and 2-period ε -equal treatment of equals for each t, t ≥ 3.
Step 3. Such allocation a exists, but is not necessarily unique. For each a ∈ A (E), let a <t ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈[t,t−1) be the allocation up to timet − 1 such that a = a <t |a ≥t .
Step 4. Let x 0 ≡ (c 0 , w 0 ) be assigned to 0; efficiency and u (x 0 ) = u (ε x 2 )
imply that x 1 ≡ (c 1 , w 1 ) is such that c 1 = (ε ) −1 ρ 1−α c 0 and w 1 = (ε ) −1 ρ −α w 0 .
Since x 2 = εx 0 , efficiency and v (ε x 2 ) = v (x 3 ) imply that x 3 ≡ (c 3 , w 3 ) is such that c 3 = εε ρ 1−β c 0 and w 3 = εε ρ −β w 0 . The conflict arises with 3-period ε-no-domination since for each ε, ε > 0, there is ρ such that x 1 < εx 3 . To show this, let α = Since this contradiction arises for each k 4 such that a <4 assigns strictly positive bundles to each generation t < 4, the proof is completed.
2) The above result in 1a), or equivalently 2a), also shows that no rule exists satisfying efficiency, 3-period ε-equal treatment of equals, and 3-period ε -no-domination with ε, ε > 0.
(⇐) The "if" part is shown by constructing rules satisfying the specific version of the axioms. The corresponding results are presented in Lemmas 4-6.
Lemma 4.
Proof. Let E ∈ E ∞ A1 be such that, w.l.g., t = 0. For each a ∈ A (E), let a <t ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈[0,t−1) be the allocation up to timet − 1 such that a = a <t |a ≥t . By Assumption A1, there existst ∈ T and prices π ∈ R L ++ such that for each kt ∈ R L + , a ≥t ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈[t,∞) ∈ P E ≥t (k t ) with π · x t = π · x t for each t, t ≥t. For each allocation a ≡ {k t , y t , x t } t∈[0,∞) ∈ A (E) (specifying also kt), defineĒ kt ≡ k 0 ,kt, F t t∈[0,t−1] , R t t∈[0,t−1] such thatk 0 = k 0 , kt = kt,F t = F t andR t = R t for each t ∈ [0,t − 1]. Clearly,Ē (kt) ∈ E. Following the proof of Lemma 1, there exists a rule ψ bcpo for each prices p ∈ R L ++ and for each economy in the domain E, thus includingĒ (kt) for each kt ∈ R L + . Let a ∈ P (E) be such that i) π · x t = π · x t ≡ γ <t for each t, t ∈ [0,t − 1]
and ii) π · x t = π · x t ≡ γ ≥t for each t, t ≥t. The existence of such allocations is granted by a <t ∈ ψ bcpo Ē (kt) for condition i) and Assumption A1 for condition ii). Finally, upper-hemicontinuity of production correspondences and continuity of preferences guarantee that there exists an allocation such that γ <t = γ ≥t , proving the result.
Lemma 5.
Proof. The reasoning of the proof is similar to the above. Assumption A2 allows satisfying equal treatment of equals for each generation fromt onwards for each kt ∈ R L + . The existence result of Lemma 2 guarantees that for each kt ∈ R L + this is also the case for generations beforet. Assumptions on production and preferences guarantee that it is possible to change kt continuously such that the allocation is efficient and all generations are indifferent to the same egalitarian equivalent bundle z, as required by the rule.
Lemma 6.
Proof. Let E ∈ E ∞ A2 be such that, w.l.g., t = 0. For each kt ∈ R L + , there is a ∈ P (E) such that: i) a <t (defined above) satisfies sequential permutation solidarity among generation beforet (due to Lemma 3); ii) a ≥t treats all generations equally fromt onwards (by A2), which is a stronger requirement than sequential permutation solidarity. Furthermore, assumptions on production and preferences guarantee that there is kt such that, on top of i) and ii), sequential permutation solidarity is also satisfied fort − 1 andt. This proves the existence of an allocation satisfying efficiency and sequential permutation solidarity for each economy in the domain E ∞ A2 .
